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Gunera-Pastrana (Gustavo) v. State, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 29 (July 8, 2021)1 
 




 Using a cumulative error test, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded the 
conviction of defendant, Gunera-Pastrana. The Court found that the defendant’s due process right 
to a fair trial had been violated by judicial, juror, and prosecutorial misconduct. 
 
Facts and Procedural History: 
 
 Gunera-Pastrana was charged and convicted of two counts of lewdness with a child under 
the age of 14 years and two counts of sexual assault of a minor under the age of 14 years. The 
district court sentenced him to 35 years to life in prison. The defendant lived with his girlfriend 
and her two children, one of which was a 12-year old girl, M.M. According to M.M., the defendant 
had touched her genitals on one occasion, sexually kissed her on another, and digitally penetrated 
her and performed cunnilingus on her on a final occasion. These facts, though disputed, led to the 
guilty verdict. The State presented no physical evidence of the crime so the issue of guilt was close, 




 Prior to the opening statements, the district court made comments to the jury regarding 
what it means to be “presumed innocent.” The district court asked “[W]hat do you really mean by 
presumption of innocence when we know that the Defendant has been arrested by the police 
department and we know that the District Attorney is prosecuting the Defendant[?] And we also 
know that the police department didn’t go out and select somebody at random to prosecute.” The 
defendant on appeal, argued that this comment and others made by the district court undermined 
his presumption of innocence, though he did not preserve the error for appellate review by 
objecting at the district court level. 
 In deciding unpreserved claims of judicial misconduct, the Court applies a three-part plain 
error review test. To succeed, an appellant must claim that (1) an error occurred, (2) that error was 
plain (clear from a casual inspection of the record), and (3) the error affected the defendant’s 
substantial rights. In finding that the trial judge’s comments were plain error, the Court noted the 
influential position that a judge holds in the eyes of the jury. Because of this influence, a trial judge 
must exhibit a level of restraint in their conduct and comments. Still, the Court found that the 
defendant’s substantial rights were not prejudiced since the jury was adequately instructed on the 




 M.M. testified against the defendant but had issues remembering the sequence of each 
occasion of sexual misconduct. In closing, the State emphasized that, rather than placing weight 
on the fact that M.M. had trouble remembering each occurrence, the jury should use “common 
 
1  By Sullivan Winesett.  
sense” when considering her testimony. Further, the district court instructed the jury to use 
common sense in reaching a verdict. After announcing the verdict, the jury foreman told the bailiff 
that the jury had googled the meaning of “common sense” to reach its verdict. After an evidentiary 
hearing held by the district court, the jury foreman testified that two jurors had googled “common 
sense” on their phones and read the definition to the other jurors even though they were instructed 
not to use the internet. However, after the foreman’s testimony, the district court did not think 
there was reason to question other jurors so the jurors who googled the term were not questioned. 
 The defendant moved for a new trial based on juror misconduct and thus was required to 
provide admissible evidence to establish that (1) juror misconduct occurred and (2) the occurrence 
of the misconduct was prejudicial. To determine whether misconduct was prejudicial, the Court 
looks to whether an average member of the jury would be influenced by the misconduct and 
whether there is a reasonable probability that the information affected the verdict. Here, the Court 
found that since the term “common sense” was so emphasized by the State and the district court, 
the jury’s use of Google to define it could have prejudiced the defendant. Further, since the district 
court suggested that no more questioning of jurors would be necessary, the defendant was not 
given the ability to show prejudice as a result of misconduct. Therefore, the Court found that the 




 The prosecutor said at the end of closing argument: “There really are two people who know 
exactly what happened in that living room and that bedroom that can talk about it. And that’s 
[M.M.] and the—.” The defendant objected to this because the Fifth Amendment and the Nevada 
Constitution prohibit a direct, and in certain circumstances an indirect, comment made by a 
prosecutor regarding a defendant’s decision not to testify. The district court sustained the objection 
and the prosecutor repeated: “There’s two people that know what happened, and [M.M.] told you 
what happened. She told you what he did to her.” 
 This was an indirect comment made by the prosecutor regarding the defendant’s decision 
not to testify. To determine whether an indirect comment constitutes a Fifth Amendment violation 
the Court examined “whether the language used was manifestly intended to be or was of such a 
character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be comment on the defendant’s 
failure to testify.”2 In applying this test to the prosecutor’s comments, the Court cited three cases 
from other jurisdictions that, while not binding, found that similar statements made by prosecutors 
violated the Fifth Amendment. The Court then took the opportunity to clarify that the comment 
“[t]here’s two people that know what happened,” is an impermissible indirect reference under the 




 The Court noted that even though the prosecutorial misconduct by itself could possibly 
warrant a reversal, the cumulative effect of the judicial, juror, and prosecutorial misconduct 
prejudiced the defendant’s due process right to a fair trial. The Court considered three factors to 
 
2  Harkness v. State, 107 Nev. 800, 803, 820 P.2d 759, 761 (1991) (quoting United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505, 
509 (7th Cir. 1968)). 
determine the cumulative error in this case: “(1) whether the issue of guilt was close, (2) the 
quantity and character of the error, and (3) the gravity of the crime charged.”3 
 First, the Court determined that the issue of guilt was close because no physical evidence 
of the crime was produced by the State and M.M.’s testimony had three inconsistencies which 
resulted in disputes over her credibility. Next, the Court determined that the three occurrences of 
misconduct, judicial, juror, and prosecutorial, were enough to satisfy the “quantity and character 
prong” of the test. Lastly, the crimes were grave because they led to the defendant being sentenced 
to 35 years to life in prison. Thus, according to this analysis, the Court found that the cumulative 




 The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded for a 
new trial. While the Court found that the prosecutorial misconduct alone may have been enough 
to warrant a reversal, they ruled in favor of the defendant based on the cumulative effect of the 
judicial, juror, and prosecutorial error. 
 
3  Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1195, 196 P.3d 465, 481 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
